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Abstract 
In  this  paper  one  considers  an  economy  in  which  individuals  can  transact  at 
"false" prices. When they  do they  encounter  quantity  constraints,  this in turn, as 
Arrow  has  noted,  stops  them  acting  as  perfect  competitors.  In  particular  they 
must  form  an  hypothesis  concerning  a  possibility  of  affecting  their  quantity 
constraints  by  a change  of price.  This hypothesis  is called  a conjecture.  A set  of 
prices  and  quantity  signals  at  which  desired  trades  are achieved  and  no  prices 
change  is  advantageous  under  the  conjecture  is  a conjectural equilibrium. Econ- 
omies  canl have  conjectural  equilibria  even  when  they  have  a  Walrasian  one. 
Naturally  one wants a theory  of conjecture formation.  In what follows it is shown, 
mainly  by examples,  that it is not fruitful to look for rational conjectural equilibria 
(defined  in  the  sequel).  One concludes  that  at  best  one  could  hope  that  agents 
conjecture  Marshallian schedules. 
I.  Introduction 
In  orthodox  theory  an  agent  is  described  by  his  endowment,  tastes  and 
technological production possibilities which are open to  him.  One does not 
enquire  how  these  characteristics  of the  agent  came  to  be  what  they  are,  nor, 
in  general,  does  one  allow  the  characteristics  to  be  affected  by  the  economic 
environment. The characteristics are arbitrarily given by the  history of the 
economy  and  of  the  agent  and  so,  for  instance,  there  are  many  equilibria 
depending on  the  characteristics. In  particular if  the  total  endowment of 
goods is  given,  any allocation of these  between agents  (in a  pure exchange 
economy), will be an equilibrium for some tastes and endowment distribution. 
There does not seem to me anything wrong with the conclusion that equilibria 
are not history free (they are not independent of initial  conditions). Indeed 
one  may  adduce  rather  strong  arguments  to  support  the  view  that  history 
free  theorems  in  the  Social  Sciences  are  bogus.  To  say  that  the  equilibrium 
set  depends  on  history  is  not  to  make  equilibrium  theory  vacuous,  the 
reverse  is the  case.  For  one  is thereby  taking  the  view  that  empirical  evidence 
is required  to generate  interesting  propositions.  The relevance  of these  remarks 
to  what  follows  will  be  seen  below. 
*  This  work  was  supported  by  National  Science  Foundation  Grant  SOC74-11446  at  the 
Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University. 
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The  orthodox description of  the  agent  is  however incomplete on  several 
counts.  The  most  important omission concerns the information available to 
the  agent. For instance if one considers the set of all physical objects in an 
economy a  partition of  this  set  will define the  goods which one agent  can 
distinguish. The partition may differ between agents and need not  be inde- 
pendent of economic signals. One need only think of second-hand motor cars 
or different qualities of labour to see that an assumption that all agents have 
identical fine partitions is not satisfactory. Pari passu the same remarks apply 
to the partitioning of states of nature; see Radner (1968). A great deal of work 
has recently been undertaken mainly in the  context  of very simple models, 
to study the consequences of enriching the agent's description by endowing him 
with an information structure and taking account of the possibility that this 
structure may be only partly a characteristic, i.e. may in part at least depend 
on economic events  (e.g. Rothschild,  1974). 
Related  to  this  is  the  observation that agents have, in general, to deduce 
their  economic environment from the  signals  which they  receive.  Thus  in 
orthodox theory the agent does not know the production possibility set of the 
economy but only relative prices. One of the beautiful aspects of the theory is 
that this is all he needs to know. Yet even in this simple orthodox world there 
is  a  theoretical lacuna: there is  no  description in  terms of the  decisions of 
agents of how prices come to be what they are. It is true that there is a very 
special  account  of  exchange  processes between  agents  which  terminate  in 
allocations which can be supported by competitive prices. But that is hardly 
satisfactory  although  even  such  special  constructions  may  be  superior 
to the auctioneer. For most markets it is simply the case that the description 
of the agent and of the signals which he receives is not rich enough for a theory 
of price formation by the agents. I have now come to the central issues to be 
studied in this  paper. Since they  are easy to  misunderstand I  shall discuss 
them further before introducing technicalities. 
The proposal to  study  an economy which is sufficiently well described to 
answer the question: "why are the signals received by agents what they are?" 
is not at all to embark on "dynamics", except in a very weak sense. The weak 
sense is that  an equilibrium must be recognizable as a stationary state  of a 
dynamic  system,  the  finer  characteristics of  which may  be  unknown.  For 
instance, in the orthodox tatonnement matters are normally too complicated 
to  give  a  precise  account  of  the  evolution of prices from a given starting 
point. But the dynamic equations induce the definition of an equilibrium as 
stationary points. If the auctioneer is replaced by the agents who change the 
prices at  which they  are willing to  trade whenever they  consider this to  be 
profitable then the stationary point of the dynamic system will have to be a 
set of signals at which agents do not see profits to be made by changing price. 
The set of stationary points or equilibria may include those of the tatonne- 
ment but clearly need not coincide with the set of equilibria of the latter. I am 
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making the  obvious point  that  the  states  which we designate as  equilibria 
cannot be independent of the  theory of how signals and allocations change. 
The underlying axiom of the Arrow-Debreu theory is that (at positive prices), 
prices are  stationary  iff  target  excess  demand is  everywhere zero. If  this 
assumption is changed, and nothing else in the description of the economy is 
changed, we may expect to find states which previously did not, and now do, 
qualify as equilibrium states. 
At  prices which are not in the  stationary set  of prices for a tatonnement 
it  is  true  by  definition  that  not  all  agents  can  carry out  their  intended 
transactions. One postulates that this gives rise to a further set of signals which 
tell some of the agents that the transactions which are open to them at these 
prices are restricted in size. One now requires a theory or rule of the generation 
of such quantity signals (e.g. a "rationing scheme"), and one requires a theory 
of the agents' adjustments to these signals. It is in this second stage that one 
needs the notion of conjectures.  If we include in the actions of an agent not 
only the amounts of each good which he wishes to trade but also the prices 
which he will announce as those at which he is willing to  trade then in the 
first instance we are looking for a correspondence  from the signals received by 
an agent to the set of actions he conjectures to be available to him. Call it the 
action correspondence.  The  equilibrium notion  is  fairly  clear: it  is  signals 
received by agents such that the best action for each in the set of possible actions 
again induces the original signals. A formal definition is found below. Such an 
equilibrium I  want to  call a conjectural  equilibrium. 
I can now return to my opening paragraph. Certainly in the above descrip- 
tion of a conjectural equilibrium the designated equilibrium states depend on 
the conjectures with which we have endowed the agents-e.g.  their beliefs of 
the  relation there might be between their ration and their announced price. 
But the conjectures are unexplained and to that extent  conjectural equilibria 
appear to be arbitrary. As a first reply one is tempted to say that this is no 
different from the arbitrary tastes of orthodoxy. Certainly this is not entirely 
unjustified. But  there is an objection to  this,  namely that  it  may  be more 
convincing to believe that there is no clear inducement to discover which are 
"correct" tastes.  I  am not  at  all  sure that  this  objection has  much force. 
A  person  brought  up  on  hamburgers may  continue  with  this  unpleasing 
diet  even if it is the case that if he tried fish and chips he would discover that 
he  preferred that.  Just  in  the  same  way  a  person may  continue  to  find 
himself unemployed ever so often  at  a given  wage and  conjecture wrongly 
that he can do nothing about it by proposing a lower wage and never undertake 
the  experiment which would reveal this mistake. The belief of the  orthodox 
that  given  sufficient time  men  discover their  true  environment suggests  a 
certain ignorance of  both anthropology and history. Children were sacrificed 
for good harvests for centuries and many people believe that the quantity of 
money  determines the  level  of money income. Both  are wrong conjectures. 
Scand.  J.  of Economics  1977 Exercises in conjectural  equilibria  213 
That conjectures may be the outcome of past experience and that they may 
be  "given" for the  theorist and discoverable by  empirical enquiry is to  me 
acceptable.  It  is  a  view  which  decisively  divides  both  Keynesians  and 
Marxists from orthodoxy. The world is to be explained at least partly by the 
way  agents perceive it  and the  way in which they  perceive it  is partly for 
history,  partly  for  sociology,  and  partly  for  psychology.  To  the  orthodox 
perception does not  enter in  the  story.  That  is  of  course why  they  are so 
sanguine about the working of the invisible hand. 
Nonetheless the  orthodox pose an interesting problem when they  suggest 
that the arbitrariness  of conjectures be removed by the requirement that they 
be "correct". As we shall see that requirement is not unambiguously defined 
and may be impossible to satisfy. In what follows I shall be mainly concerned 
with that  problem. 
II.  A  Simple  Conjectural  Economy 
Let there be H households, F firms and (1+1) goods. The generic subscript of 
an agent is a and a=h  refers to  a household and a=i  to  a firm producing 
good i.  Each firm produces only one good and each good is produced by a 
different  firm.  The  subscript  i=0  refers  to  leisure.  The  production  sets 
Yic  Rz+1 of  all  firms  are  strictly  convex  and  y i  Yi  is  the  vector  with 
yi>)0,  yio<0  and  yi=0O, j=i,  0.  Good i  is  produced by only the input of 
leisure. All Yt are compact and y 6E  Yi, yi =  =0-+yio  <0.  Households have strictly 
convex closed preferences  on R2++  1, are endowed with 1ho > 0 units of leisure (and 
nothing else) and receive the profit of firms which are distributed among them 
according  to  a  fixed  rule. One writes x^ERh  +  as the  demand vector of h, 
x=2hxh.  Lastly  let  yE X'R'+l  be the allocation of production among firms. 
I  shall  assume  here  that  households have  perfectly  competitive  conjec- 
tures. By this I mean that households choose xh  which is best in their preferences 
from the  budget set. 
Bh(p, y) = {Xh pxh < Po0hO  +  ,hiP'  Yi} 
where 0 < lh <, 1 each i. 
By  my  assumption this gives rise to  the demand functions: 
Xh =Xh(P,  -)  all  h. 
Let  firm  i  observe the price vector p ER1+, the  demand xi and a labour 
ration Li0  <0.  The latter is  a signal that  firm i  must  choose its  production 
at p  from  Yifn  {y Iy  y Lo  >Li}.  We stipulate 
E Lo=  (XhO  -  lhO) 
i  h 
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Now write 
:i(P,  xi, Lio, y) 
as the conjectured profit function of firm i.  We postulate the following prop- 
erties: 
r. 1  7ri(p,  x , Lo, yi) =p  'y for y2 with yii =x,  yo =L,o 
m.2 :ri(p, x,  Lio)  <p'yi  for yii  xi,  Yo  Lio and at least one inequality strict. 
7:.3 ~i(p, xi, L0o,  Yi)  >P'yi  for yii Xxi, Yi0o  Lio and at least one inequality strict. 
7r.4 Given (p, xi, Lio), ni  is concave in yii and  -Yio 
Each firm i  chooses y E Yi given the signal (p, xi, Lio) to  attain  the  highest 
conjectural profit. Notice that 7r.2  for instance implies that  the firm conjec- 
tures that  it  must sell at a lower price than pi  if it  wants to  produce more 
than xi and/or buy labour at a higher price than Po if it wants to employ more 
than Lio. We may write the  production choice of firm i  as 
yi = Yi(P,  xi, Lo). 
Lastly  write Lo= {Llo ... LHO. 
D.2.1.  We say that p0, LoO,  (xl ... xO),  yo is a conjectural  equilibrium  if 
(a)  x? >hXh  all  xhEBh(p?,  yo)  all  h 
(b) pOy?  = zi(pO,  x?, L%o,  y?)  -,(pO,  xo, Lio, yi)  all y, E Yi  all i 
(c) y?  -  x,  all i =  ... 1 
(d)  yio-=2;L?o  when  L%oo-(x0ho-lho) 
i  h 
The  definition  is  straightforward.  Of  course  the  economy  considered  is 
somewhat special in particular in insisting that  households are endowed with 
competitive  conjectures. In  the  sequel I  shall follow tradition  and not ask 
that  these  conjectures of households correspond to  what is the  case. 
Now the profit functions  ,( *) embody the conjectures of firms and at the 
moment  are  arbitrary up  to  7t.1-n7.4.  In  studying  the  notion  of  rational 
conjectures it will be as well not to be too ambitious at the outset. In particular 
I shall start with considering the possibility of imposing local restrictions on 
conjectures. 
To  do  this  I  need  to  define  a  conjectural equilibrium relatively  to  the 
production of firm i. Let po, Lo, (x? ... x?  ), y? be a conjectural equilibrium and 
consider yiEN(e, y?) where N(.)  is a small, (e), neighbourhood of yO  in  R'+1. 
Then 
Scand.  J.  of Economics  1977 Exercises in conjectural  equilibria  215 
D.2.2. Let p(yi), Lo(yi), (xl(Yi)  ... xH(Yi)),  Y(yi)  be called1  a conjectural  equilibrium 
relatively to yi EN(e, y)  if 
a)  ^xh(y)  ~>xh  all xhE^B(p(yi),  y(yi))}  all h 
b) P(Yi)Yk(Yi)  -  k(P(Yi), Xk(yi), Lko(Yi), Yk(yi))  7k(P(Yi), .x(yd), Lko(yi), y) 
all Yk  E Yk and all k  Xi. 
c)  Ykk(Yi) =  xk(yi)  all k-1  ... 1 
(d)  v  Yko(Yi)  = Z  Lko(Yi)  and  Lko(Yt)  =  2(Xho(Yyi)  -  ) 
fc  k  k  k  It 
It  will be seen that  the  difference between a conjectural equilibrium and a 
conjectural equilibrium relatively to y, is that in the former we do, and in the 
latter we do not,  demand that firm i should have maximum profits under its 
conjectures. The reason for this construction will become clear almost at one. 
Let Ei(yi, y,)  )c  R1+1  x RH  x RH+)  x R(Fl)(l+l)  be the set of conjectural  equi- 
libria relative  to  yi  when  y, EN(y?,e).  An  element  of  Ei(-)  is (p(yi), L(yi), 
(xl(yl)  ... xH(yi),  Y(yi)). I  write Eip( ) as the projection of Ei(')  onto the price 
space. 
D.2.3. I call (p0, xl ... x?, L?, y0) an e-reasonable  conjectural equilibrium if for 
all i=  1 ... e and given e 
either a) piy i < ~i(P?, xL%,o  y?), pi E Ep(y,, y,  e), y,  i E Yi  (g?,  e) 
or  b)  Ei(yi, y?, e) is empty. 
Let me explain the idea of D.2.3. One considers a given conjectural equili- 
brium and asks what would happen to the equilibrium profits of a firm i if it 
deviated slightly in its production plan from what, under its conjectures is an 
optimum plan.  If  such a  slight  deviation  is inconsistent,  given  the  conjec- 
tures  of  all  other firms  with  an  equilibrium (D.2.3.b),  we argue that  it  is 
reasonable for firm i not to undertake that deviation. If it is consistent with 
such an equilibrium but profits are no higher for firm i than they were without 
that  deviation  (D.2.3.a)  we also argue that  the  firm i  is reasonable in  not 
making the  deviation.  In  this of course  D.2.3.b  is the least attractive. But 
unless one is willing to open the Pandora's box of dynamics there is not much 
alternative. 
I use the terminology 'reasonable'  to distinguish the case where a firm may 
be right in its  belief that  it  cannot locally improve profits for the  'wrong' 
reason from that  where the firm is right in that  belief for the  'right' reason 
(which I  shall call 'rational'). Thus a firm may wrongly predict the relevant 
elements of E( *-)  and yet  be correct in its conclusion that it cannot improve 
itself by small changes in production. A more stringent requirement is that in 
a conjectural equilibrium each firm i  should correctly predict the element of 
E,(-).  Thus 
1 The  ith  vector  of Y(yi) is yi. 
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D.2.4. I  call (po, xl ... XH,  L0, y?) an e-rational conjectural equilibrium if 
a)  If  is an e-reasonable equilibrium 
and b) For all i  and y E  Y,n  N(e, yO) 
PiYi  =  ,(p, xi, Lfo,  y)  where  (p, xl, ...,  XH, Lo, y) E  Ei(yi, y?). 
Thus in an e-rational conjectural equilibrium not only is there no other con- 
jectural equilibrium consistent with yiE N(y,  e) in which i's profits are higher 
than  they  are  in  the  given  equilibrium, but  the  profits  attained  in  any 
conjectural  equilibrium  relatively  to  y,  are  those  which  i's  conjectures 
predict. 
Both of the definitions of e-reasonable  and 8-rational conjectural equilibrium 
are in the general equilibrium spirit and it may be thought that they are too 
demanding even  before one  has  considered the  problem of  their  existence. 
So let me consider one last alternative formulation which is more in the spirit 
of Nash equilibria. 
Let YN(yi)  be the vector y? with Yi  replacing y?. (The subscript N reminds us 
of  the  Nash  feature that  the  production vectors  of  firms other than  i  are 
fixed.)  We  require the  notion  of  an  e-Nash  deviation  from  a  conjectural 
equilibrium relatively to y, 
D.2.5.  Let  (p0, x?, *--7  X?,  LO,  y?) be  a  conjectural equilibrium. Then pN(y,) E 
R 1,  x^(y) E  R`1,  (h =l ,..,  o  H), L(yi)  RH  is called an e-Nash deviation  from 
the  given  conjectural equilibrium relatively yf if when yi E YiN(,(  y0): 
(a)  xN(y)  >hXh  all  xhEBh(pN(Yi), g(y,))  all h 
(b)  xhk(Y)  =  ykk  all k  i 
h 
E hi(yi)  = Yi 
~(Xo(Yi  )  - 
t  k4i 
-hO  (y,)  E  y?o  + Y,o 
Thus in an e-Nash deviation we calculate the equilibrium of the economy on 
the  supposition that  all firms other than i keep their productions as it  is in 
conjectural equilibrium and therefore ignore the  fact that  this  constancy of 
production may not be profit maximising for these firms under their conjec- 
tures. One may say that this is an interesting concept either because no firm i 
could  calculate  anything  more elaborate or,  more speculatively  that  for  a 
small enough firm i at e, the e-Nash deviation is a good approximation to an 
e-conjectural equilibrium relatively to y,.  One now has 
D.2.6.  The  conjectural equilibrium (pO,  x],  ...,  Lg, y?) is  e-Nash rational if 
for all i and yie  Yi,n  N(e, y,) there exists  an c-Nash deviation relatively to  i 
such that 
N(y)yi  =  i(p  (Y), X (yi), Lo  , y) 
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That  is,  in  an  e-Nash  rational  conjectural  equilibrium the  conjectural 
profit functions  of  firms correctly predict the  profits to  be  made from an 
e-Nash deviation. 
We now  have  a  good many  candidates for tying  down conjectures. One 
wants to ask two questions: (i) are there good economic grounds for supposing 
conjectural equilibria to have one or more of the characteristics captured by 
E-reasonable,  8-rational and e-Nash rational? and (ii) are all of these equilibria 
non-vacuous-that  is, could they  exist? Until we have explored (ii) it is not 
worthwhile arguing about (i). 
III.  Existence  Problems 
Given  the  assumptions  in  Section  II  one  can  show  that  a  conjectural 
equilibrium exists1 and I shall here take this for granted. To proceed to the 
next task it will be convenient to simplify the model in the non-essential way 
of  letting  firms have  competitive  conjectures in  the  labour market.  That 
is we now remove the quantity  signals Lio from the profit functions. I shall 
also suppose that  a conjectural equilibrium with Po  >0  exists and henceforth, 
without  change  of  notation,  take  po=-1  in  p.  Lastly  I  postulate  that  all 
functions that  interest me are of class C2. 
Let a'=(1,  ..., a)  be the  vector of profits p.yi.  Let us also now write 
Yio  = fi(Y)  3.1 
for the  input  of  labour required to  produce Yii. One takes  fi(*) as  convex. 
From what has already been said one may write 
Xi = Xi(p,  y) 
and so 
xi-_yi-  gi(p, y) 
where without  change of  notation  I  now  take  yERtB to  be  the  vector of 
outputs.  Also if 7ti(pi, xi, y,i) is the  conjectural profit function, let 
hi  (pi, xi, y,i  )  i(p,  ) 
- 
Then (pO,  y?) is a conjectural equilibrium if 
a) g(pO,  y)  = 
3.1 
b)  (p,  yO)  = 0 
1 A  proof  for  closely  related  models  will  be  found  in  Hahn  (forthcoming)  and  Negishi 
(1968). 
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Suppose that  (p0,  Oy)>0 and let the superscript 0 to a function denote that 
it is evaluated at (pO,  yO).  Then the conjectural equilibrium is called regular if 
M(po,  yo)= [?  fl?  (P ,Y  K  )  [ Qi.?  h? 
is of full rank (i.e. of rank 21). 
It  will be convenient to state  the regularity condition in a different form. 
Let  H always denote an I x 1 diagonal matrix where 
H? = [h]p,  H?  = [hi]j, Hy = [hII.  H  -  hh + h] 
Then 
? -  H? + Hx  xp  =  H? + Hx  o? 
o_  = H?o  +  Ho  xy  =  Ho?  +  H?  +  H[?-  I] =H + H  o  g?y 
Hence  if  M(p?, y?) is  non-singular  so  is  M*(p?, y0)  where 
M*(po,  y  H?  H?o 
D.3.1.  A  conjectural equilibrium (po, y0) will be called regular if  (pO, ?o)>0 
and M*(pO, 0o)  is of full rank. 
Now consider a regular conjectural equilibrium and take a small variation 
in the production of firm k. We want to find the conjectural equilibrium (if it 
exists),  relatively to  (y?k  ?  ) where e is very small. Suppose this conjectural 
equilibrium is (p, y). Then it  must satisfy: 
g(p  _pO)  +g(  _o)  =-  3.02  ^  -P  ^^  -^  O  1  3.2 
and  ?p,(p  -p?) +i(y  ?)  = 0  all ik 
Also one has  ykk(pk -pk)  + (O +/k(ykk))  (Ykk  -yOk)  =  k  -r  3.3 
So  if  H?(k) is  the  matrix  H? with  its  kth diagonal element replaced by 
Y?k and Hfl(k) is  the  matrix  H? with  its  kth diagonal element  replaced by 
(po  +f/(yok))  one is interested in the equations 
MlI(pO,  yO  )  (p {_yO  k+=(+k -7(-)}  3.4 
where 
M*  (p9ro)*  Y  9\  P  Yv  I  M~k  p,  ?)-[Hpo(k)  H?(k)I 
Proposition 3.1. A necessary and sufficient condition for a regular conjectural 
equilibrium to  be s-rational for e arbitrarily small is that  either the  matrix 
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MK(p0,  ?o)  be  singular for  all  k=l  , ..., 1 or that  no  equilibria relatively  to 
(y?k +? )  exist  for any1  k. 
Proof. (a) Necessity. If (p?, y?) is a conjectural equilibrium and M*(p?,  jo) 
is  of full rank for some k then  3.4  has a  solution with  7k >7?  so that  the 
equilibrium would not  be E-reasonable  and so not e-rational. 
(b) Sufficiency. If  at  (p0, y?) the  condition of the  proposition is  satisfied 
then  one can solve 
Mk(pO, yO)  (p -pO,  y-y)  =  {O} 
for  all  the  conjectural equilibria (p, y)  relatively  to  (y'k+_).  In  all  such 
equilibria 7k ==0 and there exists  no such equilibrium with  rk  c>7. 
The proposition is of course trivial-indeed  it is almost a definition of an 
e-rational conjectural equilibrium. Nonetheless  it  is  of  some  help with  the 
rather intractable problem of whether e-rational equilibria exist. To see this I 
consider an example. 
Suppose that  the  conjectural profit function of  each firm is derived from 
the  conjectural inverse demand function: 
Pi+pfl(y1-xi).  fl,<O all i  3.5 
Also assume that 
ti(Yii)  =  -ciy,  ci>O all i  3.6 
Then one verifies that H? = I, H?  {f}  while H?p(k)  has y?kk  in the kth diagonal 
place and Hz(k)  has  -flkkk  as the  kth diagonal element. 
Let us consider only regular conjectural equilibria for this economy so that 
writing small letters for the  determinant of the  matrix, m*(p,  y) 40  at  any 
conjectural equilibrium (p, y). In the  present economy one has 
ml +k,k+  -l+k,l+k  l+k= 
where I now omit the arguments (p, y) and where m* are co-factors in the usual 
notation.  If the conjectural equilibrium is e-rational and we use Proposition 
3.1 in the  present case one must have 
ml+k.k-kml+k,l  I+k =  0 
and since this  must hold for all k one now has 
ml+k.k  =1m*  all  k  3.7 
Now  let  us  specialise  somewhat  further  by  assuming  (i)  ==2. (ii)  all 
households  have  parallel  linear  Engel  curves  and  (iii)  labour  is  supplied 
inelastically  and leisure does not  enter the  utility  function. 
1 I  shall  henceforth  in  this  section  ignore  the  second  contingency.  Throughout  I am 
strictly  concerned  with  "infinitesimal  rationality",  i.e.  with  e-~ 0.  But  the  exposition  will 
serve  if sufficient  regularity  is granted. 
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It is a consequence of (ii) that gp  becomes a matrix of substitution terms which 
in view of (iii) is singular. Also a typical element of gy,  is xiyi-6jj.  If  ut  is the 
sum of profits and wages then 
x,Yi = x,i(pj-)  =  -Pj,Xi,yjj 
by (iii) where x,=  x/ilJt. Also by (iii)  jpixi,=  1. Using all of this and 3.7 one 
finds that  we require of a regular conjectural equilibrium that1 
(A)  c1l2S12  + c2l11  -=0 
where Sj  is a substitution term. From this and  (iii) one has 
C1l  t2  -  C2  1-k  38 
Pa  Pi 
We also require 
(B)  x1,[f1c2xXl-l2clx2]  +c2  = 0 
or using 3.8 
kx[p?  xl -Px2]  + C2 = 0  3.9 
These  two  conditions must  be  satisfied if  the  conjectural equilibrium is 
to  be e-rational. But  now suppose the common utility  function to  be Cobb- 
Douglas with exponents  oci  (i=  1, 2). Then 3.9 becomes 
kpXi,[Xl 
-  2] +  2 = 0  3.9' 
Since one wants k <0  it now follows that  should a2 > a  no e-rational regular 
conjectural equilibrium exists. 
As  a  second example  consider profit  conjectures based on  the  following 
conjectural inverse demand functions: 
pi(yii/xj)fi where-1  <fi  < 0  3.10 
Then one verifies that H? = {1 + fi},  Hz  -  {0}, H?(k) has y?k  in the kth diagonal 
place  and  H? has  -/tkP?.  We now assume that  clc  =  c and continue the 
assumptions (i) to  (iii) of the previous example. 
The  rather tedious  manipulations will  be  found  in  the  appendix.  Using 
Proposition 3.1  one  shows that  if  a  given  conjectural equilibrium is  to  be 
e-rational one requires 
(r21  l1(l 
+]  2)  3.11 
all  ~2(  +  #1) 
1 See  Appendix  for  manipulations. 
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and also that 
_Of21>1  3.12 
where  a  is  the  compensated elasticity  of demand for good i  for a change 
in the price of good j. From elementary theory then 3.12 can also be written as 
x>1  3.13 
X2 
From 3.11 also  111|> 1fl21  and so since p?(l+fit)=ci=l,  2 one has 
po >pO  3.14 
But now it is easy to find a hypothesis which makes the fulfilment of these 
conditions  impossible.  For  instance  let  the  common  strictly  quasiconcave 
function be homothetic with the  indifference curves having a unitary slope 
where they  cross the 45? line. Then 3.13 and 3.14 together are not possible. 
If one has enough patience one can construct other 'well behaved' economies 
which  have  no  regular s-rational  conjectural  equilibrium.  Thus  one  can 
relatively  easily find examples with three goods where the  requirements of 
Proposition 3.1 conflict with the concavity of the conjectured profit function. 
The examples suggest that there will be considerable difficulty in describing 
an economy with simple enough conjectures which also possesses an e-rational 
equilibrium. My present view is that  the  conditions will turn out to  be suf- 
ficiently  restrictive to  make the  result  uninteresting. But  there is  another 
lesson which seems important. 
In the  examples I  gave conjectures a particular form. Now if one takes e 
small  enough  what  one  is  roughly  concerned with  is  the  existence  of  an 
equilibrium where the  conjectured slope of the inverse demand curve at the 
equilibrium output accurately predicts the price in an equilibrium relatively 
to a very small deviation in a producer's output. But as we have seen this will 
depend not only on the conjectured slopes of other producers but also on their 
rates  of  change  (the terms hp, hy). In  the  examples,  in  trying  to  discover 
whether conjectured slopes can be 'tied down' by asking that they be 'correct' 
in a proper sense we made these higher order terms arbitrary.  So even had our 
conclusion been positive we should have shown that there exists an equilibrium 
in which conjectured slopes are 'correct'  only at the cost of arbitrarily  imposing 
a form on the conjectured demand function. Indeed I think that under fairly 
general assumptions one  may  be  able  to  show that  there  always  exists  a 
conjectural equilibrium with  "correct" slopes provided one  can  arbitrarily 
specify the form of the conjecture. But this means that we do not escape the 
arbitrariness of conjectures. 
Evidently there are quite hard technical problems and they require further 
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investigation. But I think there is enough evidence in this section to warrant 
the preliminary conclusion that e-rationality is not a hopeful way of avoiding 
the arbitrariness-i.e.  the exogenous, nature of conjectures. 
IV.  Nash  e-Rationality 
I shall be brief in this section for the matter requires more investigation than 
I  can give it  here. Indeed I  shall only  consider an example of 1  =2. 
Suppose that  (p?,  y?)  is  a  conjectural equilibrium and consider a  small e 
deviation from y?l by producer one. We are in the first instance interested in 
the  equilibria  (if  they exist), relatively to that deviation on the supposition 
that the output of producer two stays at yo.  Notice that such equilibria will 
not  in  general  be  conjectural  equilibria  since  producer two  will  not  be 
maximising relatively to his conjectures. Now p will be an equilibrium  relatively 
to  (Y?i  + e) when e is small enough if it  satisfies 
g(p  -p-)  =-g(Yil-  yl) 
where gp has the  usual meaning and g,  E  R2 is the  vector (xly -1,  x2y1). 
This equation can be solved, when (y11-y1?i)  0 iff g? is not singular. But 
in one of our examples where households supply labour inelastically and where 
they  ave parallel linear Engel curves, gq is a singular matrix of substitution 
terms. Let  us  call an economy where households satisfy  these  assumptions 
Hicksian (cf. Arrow & Hahn,  1971). Then 
Proposition 4.1.  Any  conjectural equilibrium of  a  Hicksian economy  where 
labour is supplied inelastically is e-Nash rational for e small enough. 
This  result  is  a  direct  consequence of  our general decision to  call  con- 
jectures rational if deviations in the actions of one agent are not compatible 
with  equilibrium  (D.2.3.b).  Of course, this  is  open to  argument. Yet  it  is 
not  easy to  see what alternative route should be followed in this  case. One 
could, for instance, relax the purely Walrasian equilibrium notion (and con- 
sider equilibria with rationing) or one could try to model the 'true' dynamics 
of  the  economy which would give  an answer to  the  agent's question: what 
will  be  the  case  if  I  deviate  slightly  from my  present  actions?  But 'not 
only  is  this  procedure technically  and  conceptually hard; it  is  one  which 
makes it even more impossible to  suppose that  agents can carry out correct 
calculations. 
So  let  me  now  suppose that  gO is  not  singular which  I  achieve  in  the 
Hicksian economy  by  dropping the  assumption that  labour is  inelastically 
supplied (i.e. that  it  does not  enter the  utility  function). Let 
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Then if  the  conjectural equilibrium is e-Nash rational one  wants  N? to  be 
singular. The argument here is  exactly  as in the  previous section the  only 
difference  being  that  Y22=Y22  by  construction. 
To see the difficulties one may now encounter let the common utility func- 
tion  be  Cobb-Douglas with  exponents  oc (i =0  ... 2)  where the  subscript 0 
refers to leisure. Suppose further that  conjectures have the form of 3.9, and 
choose units so that  c = 1, i=l,  2. 
Then the  condition that  N? be singular reduces in this  special case to 
+oO  + a  2 -  2  1  (2-1  )- 
For 7.1 -n.4  to  hold one wants fi,  <0  and hence 
1 -  2x2 
If 4.1 is violated then no e-Nash rational conjectural equilibrium is possible. 
For with fl1  > 0 no profit maximising choice of the firm exists while for fl1  < 0, 
No cannot vanish. 
Once again it is rather doubtful that one can find sufficiently general con- 
ditions which would ensure the  existence  of an e-Nash rational conjectural 
equilibrium. But  this is a matter for further study. 
V.  Some  Conclusions 
To a practical economist it will be no surprise that the notions of rationality 
in  conjectures explored here are very  unpromising. Indeed he would argue 
that  the  questions are incorrectly formulated. For either the typical firm is 
'small' and hence one should ignore the general equilibrium repercussions of 
its own actions or it is significant in which case the proper approach is either 
game theoretic or a rule of thumb. 
There evidently is some force in this objection. On the other hand unless a 
firm is so small (strictly of measure zero), as to make a perfectly competitive 
conjecture e-rational in  my  sense, it  will make mistakes when it  acts  on a 
conjectured demand curve derived from partial equilibrium hypotheses. By 
this I mean that it correctly calculates the slope of the demand curve on the 
hypothesis that all other prices and outputs other than its own are fixed. The 
question of course is whether these mistakes are small enough to be 'sensibly' 
ignored. 
With  sufficient  assumptions  (which  certainly  must  exclude  the  Cobb- 
Douglas utility  function) one can almost certainly establish the existence of a 
"Marshallian e-conjectural  equilibrium". That  would be  an  equilibrium in 
which producers have  chosen optimally relatively  to  observed demand and 
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price and have correctly calculated the slope of their demand curve at this 
point  on the assumption that  all other prices and outputs remain constant. 
There will be some technical difficulties since one will not  be sure without 
special hypotheses that  conjectural profit functions are concave everywhere. 
But  there  certainly is  a  class  of  utility  for  which this  will  be  true.  Such 
equilibria will not be e-reasonable or 8-rational. Hence in an actual experiment 
a firm may discover that it is mistaken. Depending on cross-elasticities these 
mistakes may be 'large' for a 'small' firm. 
All of this requires further study and the present paper is no more than an 
introduction to  some of the  questions which arise. My present view is that 
if it  will prove possible to  make conjectures less arbitrary it will have to be 




Sll  S12  Xl(p1  -  -  1  x1(p2-  c2) 
=S21  S22  xr2x(P1  -1)  C2,(P-c2)  -  1 
1  0  P1  0 
0  1  0  l2 
Adding pi  times first row to P2 times second row gives 
Sll  S12  Xl/1(Pl-  C)-  1  Xl/,(P2-  2) 
0  0  -Ci  -c2 
}*  =- 
1  0  fi  o 
0  1  0  0 
Let A be the top right-hand 2 x 2 determinant. Then 
m*  = S1fl1~c2-Sl2fl2C1+A 
M3l  =  -S12Clq2  + A 
=  Sll  C2fl1  + A 
From 3.7: m* =m- l  gives 
Sll  Cl  + S12c1P2  = 0 
which is  A  of the text.  For 3.7 also 2m1 =m* or 
SIfl 1c2?  + Sl2A2C1-A = 0 
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and so 
A = C--C2Xl,(pl  -Ci)  +clx,I(p2  -C2) = c2  + [c2Xl-1 -421x2]  = 0 
which is  B  of the text. 
Constant Elasticity Conjectures 
We have 
[{1 + f  }0 
whence 
i  M*=  rH  (I  +,) g?l 
Proceeding as in the previous example and using p? -c=  -fkP  one finds 
|Y|  =  xl,#l  cpl  -fl2cp2  +c  (A.1) 
Also 
_g,  gpO  y,  2 
Y?1 O  -al  p?  0 
0  (1+f,2)  0  0  _ 
and similarly for M*. One finds 
m}  =  (1 + /2)  [x?j ?j -  p1  p?  m3*] 
m2  =  (1 +  Pl)[x|  g| I -f2P2  m44] 
Calculating further yields 
m43 =  -Six(1  +f2)c,  m4 = S12(l +fl)c  (A.2) 
By  Proposition  3.1  one  wants  m*==ma*=0 if  the  equilibrium  is  to  be 
e-rational. So 
Pi  po  m33/x3 = /.  p?  m44/x.  (A.3) 
or by (A.2) 
-  f1(1  +  2) COll =  l2(1  +  f1)  a12  (A.4) 
which then yields 3.11 of the text. 
Next  since m*s  >0,  m4 >0,  fl >0  one must have 
Igl <0. 
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So from (A.1) 
p  lp_  1(l +  2)  > 1 
/22P20  2(1  +  1) 
This confirms 3.12 of the text. 
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